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1.0   Introduction 
   Beyond the issue of approvals of GM-products as discussed in the companion paper, 
Post-Moratorium  European  Union  Regulation  of  Genetically  Modified  Products:  Trade 
Concerns (Viju et al., 2011), there is another issue where the evolving EU regime for GM-
products needs to be examined in the context of barriers to international trade. This is the case 
where an imported non-GM product is contaminated with an unapproved GM-product. There are 
two categories of unapproved GM-product events. The first is commonly known as a low-level 
presence (LLP) where the GM product is approved in the export market but not in the importing 
market. The second form of GM event is known as adventitious presence (AP), occurring when 
the GM product is not approved in any market (i.e. is an experimental product or is cultivated 
under  confined  field  trials)
1.  Unapproved GM events are becoming more common as the 
commercial production of GM crops has spread around the globe , with individual countries 
having different authorization and regulatory procedures, resulting in non-simultaneous approval 
of new GM crops. This discrepancy leads to asynchronous authorizations where a GM crop may 
be fully approved for commercial use in one country, but not in others.  
 
The stated EU policy is 0.9 percent threshold of tolerance for authorized GMO LLP in 
non-GM food and feed products. Any conventional product found with 0.9 percent GM co-
mingling must consequently be labelled as GM. The EU maintains zero tolerance for the LLP of 
unauthorized GMOs in conventional food products meaning there can be no imports when any 
co-mingling is found. Zero tolerance, however, must be operationalized. As it is commercially 
impossible to test every individual grain of an imported shipment, sampling and testing methods 
as well their thresholds must be specified for exporters. In other words, potential exporters need 
to  be  informed  as  to  what  they  must  do  to  satisfy  the  EU  that  their  shipments  of  non-GM 
products are free of contamination. 
 
While  there  have  been  other  examples  of  non-GM  imports  into  the  EU  being 
contaminated with GM material, in 2009 there was a major LLP event where the exporter had a 
clear  desire  to  continue  to  have  access  to  the  EU  market.  This  case  provides  an  excellent 
opportunity to assess this aspect of the EUs regulatory regime for GM products. On September 8, 
2009, Germany issued an EU-wide Rapid Alert notification confirming the presence of GM-flax 
in some samples of flax imports from Canada. Imports of Canadian flax were embargoed until 
Canadian exporters could satisfy the EU regulators that shipments conformed to EU standards. 
The process of satisfying EU regulators entailed the development of a detailed sampling and 
testing regime. The GM-flax product that co-mingled with non GM-flax is the variety known as 
CDC
2 Triffid. The examination of the Triffid flax case provide s considerable insight into what 
exporters  to  the  EU  can  expect  if  they  are  found  to  have  shipments  contaminated  with 
unapproved GM material. 
 
                                                            
1 While there are no universally agreed definitions, current industry and government parlance  uses adventitious 
presence (AP) to describe co-mingling of GM material that is not approved in any jurisdiction while low level 
presence (LLP) is used to describe instances of where GM material is found that is not approved in the country of 
import but approved in another jurisdiction. The authors have chosen to use these definitions, though others may 
disagree. 
2 CDC stands for the Crop Development Centre at the University of Saskatchewan in Canada where the Triffid 
variety was developed.  2 
 
The  EU  regulatory  regimes  for  both  new  approvals  of  GM  products  and  GM 
contamination are in disequilibrium – the former due to the difficulty in finding a politically 
acceptable compromise and the latter due to technical improvements in detection. In the case of 
Triffid, flax shipments from Canada could have been co-mingling for up to a decade but there 
were no Triffid-specific tests which could detect it. While unauthorized but known GMs are 
often detected with the same methods used for authorized GMs, it is unlikely that the appropriate 
detection methods are always readily available. As a result, the regulatory processes have not 
been transparent. The findings of this paper should improve the transparency for both exporting 
firms and those interested in trade policy. 
 
2.0  Low Level Presence
3 of Triffid Flax 
   
  There are two main types of commercially cultivated flax. Fibre flax is grown primarily 
for its long fibres that are used in the production of linen cloth. Oil seed flax (also known as 
linseed) is largely grown for industrial use, with the oil used in the manufacture of linoleum and 
paint. CDC Triffid is an oil seed variety. The flax seed is crushed to extract the oil, with the 
residual meal used as an animal feed. Small quantities of oil seed flax are also consumed by 
humans. The human market for flax seed has increased in recent years as it has been discovered 
that consuming flax can impart considerable health benefits. There is no segregation of seed to 
be used for industrial use from seed destined for human consumption in export shipments. In the 
case of oil seed flax shipments from Canada to the EU, flax for human consumption is sourced 
from common cargo. 
 
In  most  years,  Canada  is  the  world‟s  largest  flax  producer  –  approximately  750,000 
metric  tonnes  annually.  Less  than  20  percent  of  Canadian  flax  production  is  consumed 
domestically.  Until  the  incident  when  the  LLP  of  Triffid  flax  was  detected  in  the  EU, 
approximately 70 percent of Canada‟s flax exports were destined for the EU. With the detection 
of  Triffid  flax,  imports  of  all  Canadian  flax  were  first  embargoed  and  then,  with  Canada‟s 
development of a testing and monitoring Protocol which was subsequently accepted by the EU, 
the embargo was lifted. As yet, Canadian exports of flax to the EU have not fully recovered. In 
the short run, as the Protocol was being put into operation – and risks were high for Canadian 
exporters – much of the Canadian flax surplus to domestic requirements apparently moved to 
China at prices much lower than were typically received in Europe. This suggests firstly, that the 
testing Protocol may be costly to implement, making alternative markets more lucrative for some 
Canadian producers. Secondly, any shipment that tested positive for Triffid could not be off-
loaded in the EU. Therefore Canadian exporters had no alternative but to divert these shipments 
to other markets, at whatever price they could obtain (usually discounted).  As the operation of 
the Protocol has become transparent and refined, Canadian exports to the EU have begun to 
recover.  
 
                                                            
3 For this discussion, the authors have classified the Triffid GM event as LLP. The case of Triffid is unique as it was 
approved by both Canada and the US on a scientific basis but is no longer marketed as it was withdrawn by the 
developer due to concerns over the potential loss of the EU market for flax. In other words, there is no scientific 
reason for it no longer being approved. The science underlying the approval has not been questioned in this case of 
„approved and then withdrawn‟. As Triffid was previously approved and the science behind the approval has not 
been disputed, the authors have interpreted the Triffid GM event as LLP. Others may believe it should be classified 
as AP. 3 
 
The  Triffid  variety  of  flax  was  developed  through  publicly  funded  research  at  the 
University of Saskatchewan‟s CDC in the mid-1980s. The genetic modification made the Triffid 
variety resistant to soil residues of sulfonylurea-based herbicide – a herbicide commonly used on 
cereal crops which persists in the soil until the next growing season. Field trials of Triffid flax 
began at the end of the 1980s and the regulatory approval process was initiated by the CDC in 
1994.  Triffid  received  official  approval  for  use  as  animal  feed  in  1996  and  for  human 
consumption in 1998. Approval was also obtained in the United States. 
 
By  the  late  1990s,  however,  it  was  apparent  that  GM-products  were  becoming  an 
important  political  issue  in  the  EU.  While  future  developments  in  the  EU  were  not  clear, 
segments  of  the  Canadian  industry  became  concerned  about  continued  market  access  for 
Canadian flax in the EU. The CDC, Triffid‟s developer, decided to voluntarily deregister the 
Triffid variety from the market to pre-empt potential problems with export markets, particularly 
the  EU  (EC,  2010e).  At  that  point,  Triffid  had  not  yet  been  commercially  grown  but  seed 
companies  were  in  the  process  of  growing  the  Triffid  variety  to  produce  seed  destined  for 
commercial sale to farmers. A recall and crush of these initial seed stocks was undertaken in 
2001. The germ plasm and other materials held by the CDC were incinerated. The CDC Triffid 
variety was deregistered in 2001. Thus, Triffid flax was never grown commercially and thought 
to have been removed from the ecosystem. Tests did not exist that could detect the presence of 
Triffid, but testing technology is not static. 
 
In July 2009, GM material was found in a shipment of flax in the EU. Initially it was 
thought that the material was the result of cross-contamination from Canadian GM canola. This 
event, however, led to an increased detection effort in the EU. In September 2009 Triffid was 
identified  in  bakery  goods  in  Germany,  the  first  of  in  excess  of  one  hundred  positive  tests 
reported through the EU‟s Rapid Alert system for Food and Feed (RASFF). Contamination was 
widely  dispersed  geographically  in  cereal  and  bakery  products  made  by  EU  firms.  The  EU 
market was closed to Canadian flaxseed. The Canadian Grain Commission (CGC) initiated its 
own testing which confirmed the presence of trace amounts of Triffid material in some Canadian 
flaxseed shipments.  
 
From the Canadian perspective, a mechanism was required that would allow renewed 
exports of Canadian flax to the EU.  A Protocol was developed by CGC in consultation with the 
Flax Council of Canada
4 and DG SANCO, the European Commission Directorate for Health and 
Consumer Affairs. The Protocol puts in place a mechanism for documenting, sampling and 
testing for the presence of Triffid flax in the supply chain of Canadian flaxseed destined for the 
EU. The Protocol satisfies the zero tolerance policy for LLP GMOs as currently interpreted in 
the EU, i.e. maximum acceptable level of risk of CDC Triffid is  at the 0.01 percent level. The 
0.01 percent detection level established by the Protocol is linked to a level that can be accurately 
and reliably detected by the Triffid-specific test. However, the threshold represents a very high 
commercial risk as it has proven nearly impossible for the grain storing and handling companies 
to achieve it and, thus, is of considerable economic importance.  
 
                                                            
4 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC), Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada and the Canadian 
Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) were also involved (CGC, 2010a). 4 
 
Testing all along the supply chain began in the fall of 2009 and by April 2010, over 5000 
tests had been conducted. A widespread but extremely low level presence of Triffid was found in 
the  Canadian  flax  production  and  distribution  system.    One  hundred  and  seventy  four  (3.4 
percent)  of  the  samples  tested  positive  at  0.01  percent  while  another  300  (6  percent)  tested 
positive at less than 0.01 percent.  Of the 213 tests conducted on pedigreed seed, 6.5 percent 
tested positive at 0.01 percent (Stephens, 2010). However, the level of detection has dropped in 
2011. Only 7 percent of 4,003 samples in 2010-2011 were found positive compared to 10 percent 
positive samples out of 6,013 farm samples tested in 2009-2010. For pedigree seed, the positive 
samples decreased from 7 percent in 2009-2010 to only 2 percent in 2010-2011. Similarly, for 
farm-saved seeds, only 6 percent of samples proved to be positive in 2010-2011 compared to 14 
percent in 2009-2010 (Vakulabharanam, 2011). 
 
All of this was done without any scientific justification regarding the imposition of trade 
restrictions  nor  a  risk  assessment.  Triffid  is  not  commercially  grown  and,  in  fact,  may  be 
technically obsolete because the main herbicide it was bred to resist has been supplanted by 
superior products in the marketplace for herbicides. Thus, no application for approval in the EU 
for Triffid will ever likely be made. Hence, it is not clear how EU policy toward Triffid flax fits 
within the EU‟s SPS obligations. 
 
3.0   EU GMO Traceability and Detection 
  The  EU  has  introduced  a  number  of  regulations  to  ensure  GM  safety,  detection  and 
traceability  and  labelling  (Table  1).    While  the  process  of  food  safety  assessment  is  the 
responsibility of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the operation of GM food control 
systems  is  performed  by  the  European  Commission  through  the  Community  Reference 
Laboratory  (CRL)  and  the  competent  authorities  of  individual  member  states.  The  EU 
regulations  on  traceability  are  the  most  stringent  rules  when  considered  in  an  international 
context. The traceability and labelling regulations facilitate the enforcement of the EU‟s policies 
of zero tolerance for unauthorized GMOs and adventitious presence as discussed previously. 
Davison and Bertheau (2007) describe a typical GMO decision tree utilized under EC labelling 
regulations (Figure 1).  It may serve as a general model or be modified for safety purposes.  
 
3.1  Zero Tolerance and Adventitious Presence 
  In the EU, when either the LLP of an unauthorized by the EU, or AP of a GMO occurs, 
the  product  is  considered  an  illegal  substance  by  EU  officials  and  can  trigger  a  significant 
reaction   including  emergency  measures
5.  The European Commission  food  safety  Regulation 
                                                            
5 The unintentional and seemingly unavoidable co-mingling of trace amounts of one type of seed, grain or food 
product with another during growing, harvesting, transport or processing is a common occurrence. When applied to 
the situation where GMOs are co-mingled with conventional products, two scenarios can occur within the European 
Union context. Keeping in mind the definitions of LLP and AP as discussed in footnote 1, the first situation is 
when authorized  (by the EU) GMOs  are found  in non-GM products and is commonly referred to as low level 
presence (LLP) by the EU. The second is when unauthorized (by the EU) GMOs are found and can be either LLP 
(as in authorized in other jurisdictions) or adventitious presence (AP) (as in not authorized anywhere). The EU has a 
0.9 percent threshold of tolerance for authorized (by the EU) GMO LLP in non-GM food and feed products. Should 
authorized GMO amounts greater than 0.9 percent be detected in non-GM products, the product must be labelled as 
GM. For seed products, the EU maintains a maximum threshold limit of 0.5 percent of GMO content for a specified 5 
 
Table 1. EU Legislation and Regulations Governing the Authorization Process for GMOs 
Directive 
2001/18/EC 
Regulates the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment, including through cultivation, and 
requires a thorough environmental and health risk assessment 
Directive 
2008/27/EC 
Amends  Directive  2001/18/EC  on  the  deliberate  release  into  the  environment  of  GMOs  by 
introducing references to the new regulatory procedure with scrutiny. Adopted by the Council and 
Parliament, March 2008   
Directive 2009/41  Recast  Directive  90/219  concerning  the  common  measures  for  the  contained  use  of  genetically 
modified micro-organisms for the purposes of protecting human health and the environment 
Regulation 2004/65  Established  a  system  for  the  development  and  assignment  of  unique  identifiers  for  genetically 
modified organisms 
Regulation 178/2002  Resulted in the creation of EFSA and the system of traceability with the concept of at least one step 
forwards and one step backwards in the food chain 
Regulation 
1829/2003 
Establishes procedures for the authorization, supervision and labeling of genetically modified food 
and feed and aims to guarantee a high level of protection for human life and health, animal health, the 
environment and consumers' interests while ensuring that the internal market functions properly. 
Regulation 
1830/2003 
Broadens the concepts contained in 1829/2003 and includes all types of foodstuffs containing or 




Concerns  the  transboundary  movement  and  accompanying  documentation  for  living  modified 
organisms destined for deliberate release, or for food and feed or for immediate processing, under the 
terms of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
Regulation 
1981/2006 
Amends 1829/2003 to accommodate Community Reference Laboratory for GMOs 
Regulation 2008/298  Amends  1829/2003  to  confer  power  to  the EC  to  determine  whether  a  GMO  product  would  be 
assessed according regulatory procedure with scrutiny in the areas of lowering thresholds for the 
labeling of  adventitious GMO  presence and measures regarding certain labeling and information 
requirements 
Regulation 2004/641  Provides the detailed rules regarding an application for the authorization of new genetically modified 
food  and  feed,  the  notification  of  existing  products  and  adventitious  or  technically  unavoidable 
presence of genetically modified material which has benefited from a favorable risk evaluation 
Regulation 298/2008  Amends  regulation  (EC)  No  1829/2003  on  genetically  modified  food  and  feed,  as  regards  the 
implementing power conferred on the Commission. March 2008 
Recommendation 
2003/556/EC 
Sets guidelines for the development of national strategies and best practices to ensure the coexistence 
of GMOs with conventional and organic farming, in order to help Member States develop national 
(legislative)  strategies  for  coexistence.  In  March  2006,  the  Commission  adopted  a  report  on  the 
implementation of such national measures (COM (2006)104). 
Recommendation 
2010/C200/01 
Proposed July 2010 
The Commission proposed to confer to Member States the freedom to allow, restrict or ban the 
cultivation  of  Genetically  Modified  Organisms  (GMOs)  on  part  or  all  of  their  territory.  While 
keeping unchanged the EU's science-based GM authorization system, the adopted package consists of 
a Communication, a new Recommendation on co-existence of GM crops with conventional and/or 
organic  crops  and  a  draft  Regulation  proposing  a  change  to  the  GMO  legislation.  The  new 
Recommendation on co-existence allows more flexibility to Member States taking into account their 
local,  regional  and  national  conditions  when  adopting  co-existence  measures.  The  proposed 
regulation amends Directive 2001/18/EC to allow Member States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation 
of GMOs in their territory. 
 
 
Source: adapted from Vicario, 2010, Davison and Bertheau, 2007 and Europa, 2008b. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
list of seed products as per regulation EC 641/2004 (EurLex, 2004). The EU maintains a zero tolerance policy for 
the  presence  of unauthorized (by  the  EU)  GMOs,  regardless  of  its  status  elsewhere  (AP  or  LLP);  as  every 
unauthorized GMO is presumed to be unsafe by the EU, even minute AP or LLP of an unauthorized GMO in a 
product can trigger a significant reaction from EU officials including emergency measures. Should unauthorized 
GMOs be discovered via the established detection and traceability system, the EC food safety regulation (Regulation 
(EC) 178/2002) allows the adoption of appropriate emergency measures for imported food and feed from a third 
country where the risk cannot be contained satisfactorily by the affected Member State(s) (EC, n.d.a). 6 
 
Figure 1: A Decision Tree for Labelling GMO Food and Feed 
 
 
Source: Davison and Bertheau (2007), page 5. 
 
 
178/2002 allows the enactment of emergency measures for imported food and feed should an 
unauthorized GMO be found in the EU and the affected Member State cannot satisfactorily 
contain  the  risk  (EC,  n.d.a).  Emergency  measures  can  include  the  assignment  of  special 
conditions, temporary or long term import suspensions, or the closing of markets. 
 
The  EU‟s  zero  tolerance  for  LLP  of  unauthorized  GMOs  is  increasingly  difficult  to 
operationalize as the commercial production of GM crops is a global activity, with individual 
countries having different authorization and regulatory procedures, resulting in non-simultaneous 
approval of new GM crops. The EU regulatory procedure for the approval of new GM crops is 
very different and  much lengthier than in other countries. For example, in the US, the GM 
authorization requires on average 15 months, while in the EU the process is longer than two and 
a half years (EC, 2007). This discrepancy leads to asynchronous authorizations where, while a 
GM  crop  is  fully  approved  for  commercial  use  in  one  country,  it  is  not  in  others.  The 
combination of asynchronous authorizations with the EU‟s zero tolerance policy of LLP of 
unauthorized GM crops can negatively affect international trade destined for the EU. The degree 
of  economic  impact  depends  also  on  the  EU‟s  trade  response,  which  can  vary  from  double 
testing  at  import/export  points  to rejection  of  imports  and  withdrawal  of  products  that  have 
already entered the EU market.   
 7 
 
For example, EU imports of US-sourced maize and rice were halted in 2006 because of 
the trace detection of GM Herculex maize and LibertyLink rice. Herculex maize was approved in 
the US but not in the EU at the time, while LibertyLink rice was authorized in the US only for 
experimental cultivation (Stein and Rodriguez-Cerezo, 2010). Potential trade disruptions could 
become more severe and more frequent given the increasing rate of GM crop development and 
adoption in exporting countries, but not in the EU.  
 
Currently,  there  are  about  30  commercial  GM  crops  cultivated  worldwide,  but  it  is 
forecasted that by 2015, there will be more than 120 varieties (Stein and Rodriguez-Cerezo, 
2010).  Given  the co-mingling  that occurs  within  international  shipping,  the  AP  and  LLP  of 
GMOs may occur in all transboundary shipments of all commodities, GM or non-GM. Testing is 
not necessarily a solution for managing unapproved traces as, firstly, depending on the testing 
performed, the outcomes can vary between the origin and destination and, secondly, destination 
testing results in large risks for importers and exporters. Destination testing means that already 
transported product can be refused entry, leading either to the cost of returning the product to the 
country  of  export  or  the  costs  of  securing  an  alternative  export  market.  Given  the  cost  of 
demurrage and ongoing ship hiring rates, losses can mount quickly.  
 
Some countries grant authorizations for GM crops based upon the GM crop‟s impact on 
their exports. For example, CDC Triffid flax received final food safety authorization in Canada 
in  1998,  but  was  denied  approval  by  the  UK‟s  designated  authority  to  which  EU  GMO 
authorizations were submitted. As a result, Triffid was never released for commercial cultivation 
in North America. Given that the EU is the largest export market for Canadian flaxseed, any 
potential closure of the EU market was seen as disastrous, and segments of the Canadian flax 
industry lobbied for the withdrawal of Triffid from the market. CDC discontinued Triffid flax 
production for the sake of removing any risk of losing the EU as an export market for Canadian 
flax (EC, 2010e). A considerable effort was made to destroy all Triffid seed stock and no further 
production was authorized. However, even in these situations, unwanted mixing of GMs can 
result  from  experimental  or  illegal  cultivation  of  which  Triffid  flaxseed  is  a  clear  case, 
exemplifying an unwanted mixing of GM with non-GM seed into a GM event. As reported 
above,  in  September  2009,  the  EC,  followed  by  the  Canadian  Grain  Commission  (CGC) 
confirmed the presence of trace amounts of GM Triffid material in Canadian flaxseed shipments, 
which resulted in the closure of the EU market for Canadian flaxseed.   
 
In July 2008, the WHO/FAO Codex Alimentarius Commission adopted an amendment in 
an annex to the GM food assessment that introduced a practical set of simplified risk assessment 
procedures for the temporary approval of LLP GM products, which are already approved by the 
exporter, but not by the importer. The guidelines temporarily allow the trace presence of GM 
products in the process of receiving full authorization  in commodity shipments. Further, the 
Codex Annex encourages the exchange of information between exporter and importer regulators. 
As the Codex Annex satisfies both exporters and importers, it was adopted by consensus by the 
over 160 members of the Codex Alimentarius.  
 
However, the Codex Annex is very flexible in terms of implementation options. Firstly, it 
refers to different categories of products without specifying whether the rules apply to each 
category in the same way and, secondly, it does not define low level presence, allowing countries 8 
 
to  decide  what  can  be  considered  low  level  presence  (Gruere,  2009).  The  flexibility  of  the 
standard limits its usefulness and reflects the political differences regarding the issue of GM 
regulation. The Codex Annex cannot, however, be applied in case of Triffid as; firstly, it was 
never considered for authorization by the EU and, secondly, it was never allowed for commercial 
cultivation in Canada. 
 
3.2  Detection and Testing Procedures 
 
Another important issue is the difficulty of detecting unauthorized GMs. Part of the GM 
authorization procedure is dependent upon the development of methods for detection, sampling 
and identification for specific GM traces. The detection of genetic elements relies mostly on 
Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) or quantitative real-time PCR (qPCR) approaches to testing. 
The testing is generally performed in two phases. During the general detection phase, screening 
methods targeting the most common genetic elements found in GM crops are used. In case of 
GM  presence,  event-specific  methods  are  used,  followed  by  the  quantification  of  the  GM 
presence (Morisset et al., 2009). Unauthorized but known GMs (AP) are often detected with the 
same methods used for authorized GMs (LLP). However, for unauthorized GM products, the 
available  information  is  not  sufficient  for  a  full  safety  assessment  in  accordance  with  EU 
standards and it is unlikely that the appropriate detection methods are always readily available. 
Thus, the speed of the detection process depends on how fast the CRL validates event-specific 
methods of detection.  
 
From a technical perspective, both the level at which GM presence, whether AP or LLP, 
can be detected and the level at which it can be quantified represent two important issues. The 
current laboratory practices allow the detection of traces of 0.1 percent presence or above, while 
the level of confidence is dependent on the number of samples and the number of controls (Then 
and Stolze, 2009). According to a report by the UK Central Science Laboratory (CSL), seed 
testing and detection methods vary widely among the EU Member States (MS). Sampling varies 
from  100  percent  of  all  seeds  to  no  sampling  and  testing,  while  testing  usually  operates  in 
accordance to established and recognized standards. The threshold level for LLP of GMOs (i.e. a 
GM product that has received authorization in the EU but is found co-mingled in a conventional 
product) at which shipment lots are rejected or must be labelled as GM is also not consistent 
among MS; while most MS have zero tolerance or 0.1 percent, others have tolerance levels of 
0.5 percent, 0.7 percent or 0.9 percent. MS are able to adjust the control program in terms of 
sampling, number of samples taken, detection limits and decisions taken regarding labelling and 
enforcement (CSL, 2007). Thus, by definition, 100 percent seed purity is unachievable and the 
zero threshold must be defined and set in practice, taking into account any technical constraints.  
 
On  February  23,  2011,  the  European  governments  agreed  with  the  European 
Commission‟s proposal for ending the zero tolerance policy and allowing traces of LLP GM 
products up to a 0.1 percent threshold in imports of animal feed. The proposal is only applicable 
to animal feed and not to food for human consumption. Member States had disagreed over the 
coverage of the proposal; some wanted the threshold to be applied only to GMOs that have 
already  been  approved  by  EFSA  (Inside  US  Trade,  2011).  The  conditions  under  which 
unapproved GM crops would qualify for the threshold have been strengthened such that the 
crops in question must have been approved in one or more non-EU producing countries and an 9 
 
EU authorization application must have already been filed with EFSA for at least three months 
(Euractiv, 2011b; SaskFlax, 2011). The regulation for this technical solution was endorsed by 
SCoFCAH on February 22, 2011 and it is now subject to scrutiny by the European Parliament 
and  Council;  if  these  bodies  do  not  oppose  the  draft,  the  measure  will  be  adopted  by  the 
Commission (EC, 2011)
6.   
 
3.3  Case Studies - Economic Impacts Arising From AP of Unauthorized GM  
 
A search of the NGO-managed GM Contamination Register indicates 223 cases of non-
GM contamination by unauthorized GM material worldwide during the period 1997 - 2010, with 
141 cases occurring in Europe. Some cases of contamination with GM material refer to Canadian 
rapeseed/canola  (1997),  US  corn  (EU  moratorium/de  facto  import  ban,  1998),  Starlink  corn 
(processed corn approved for animal feed but not for food in the US, 2000), Bt10 corn (AP in 
corn gluten for feed, 2005), Liberty Link rice 601 and 604 (AP in 2006), Herculex maize (LLP, 
2006/2007),  Roundup  Ready  II  and  Liberty  Link  (soya,  2008),  BT  63  rice  (AP,  2008), 
MON88017,  MON89034  and  MIR  604  (corn  in  soya,  2009)  and  FP  967  (Triffid  flax, 
2009/2010) (COCERAL, 2010).  
 
  3.3.1  GM Maize 
 
In 2005, the US mission to the EU announced the accidental release of GM maize, Bt10, 
in the US. Bt10 is a GM maize line which was developed together with Bt11 maize in the 1990s 
by the Swiss-based company Syngenta. Bt10 maize is resistant to European corn borer, but its 
development was discontinued before it reached the stage of regulatory approval. The AP event 
occurred by accidental labelling of some batches of Bt11 as Bt10. As of 2001, US exports of 
maize  to  the  EU  were  likely  to  be  contaminated  with  Bt10.  As  a  result,  the  European 
Commission  together  with  the  MS  adopted  Decision  2005/317/EC,  which  established  the 
conditions under which US maize products could enter the EU. Firstly, each consignment of GM 
corn gluten feed and brewers grains originating from the US must be accompanied by a report 
demonstrating the absence of GM Bt10 and, secondly, the MS had to take measures to deal with 
products that were already on the EU market. Between April and September of 2005, 1600 
analytical tests were carried out by US authorities for corn gluten feed intended for export to the 
EU and more than 1400 controls were carried out by the MS at point of import or on products 
already in the EU market. However, no positive results were recorded (EC, 2006). Even though 
the Commission reported that there was no evidence that the emergency measures negatively 
impacted the exports of maize from the US, economic costs were increased on both sides due to 
the additional analysis and control measures.  
 
Another variety of Bt maize, MON88017, which was authorized for cultivation in the US 
in 2005, but was not yet authorized in the EU, was found as a LLP event in US shipments of soy 
meal in 2009 and resulted in an EU import ban of US sourced soy meal. MON88017 is resistant 
to  European  corn  borer  and  is  herbicide-tolerant.  In  April  of  2009,  EFSA  issued  a  risk 
assessment of MON88017 classifying it as  harmless.  However,  the  Commission  proposal to 
grant authorization for MON88017 did not receive support from the MS. The continued import 
                                                            
6 The status of the technical solution in feed will likely be discussed at the next upcoming meetings of the GM Food 
and Feed Section of SCoFCAH, provisionally scheduled for July 20, 2011 and Sept 22-23, 2011. 10 
 
ban for soy products had large negative economic impacts, including a shortage of soy-based 
feed in the EU (GMO Compass, 2009). 
 
The de facto ban of US maize due to MON88017 forced EU countries to import the only 
EU-authorized GM maize from Argentina. In 2007, when Argentina approved a new GM strain, 
EU importers were forced to purchase maize only from Brazil, paying a premium of roughly 
€50-70 per ton above the price of US maize (Gruere, 2009).  
 
  3.3.2   GM Rice 
 
In 2006, traces of Liberty Link 601 (LL601), a GM variety of rice, were discovered in 
rice being sold in Europe, Africa and Asia. The EU immediately halted the imports of long grain 
rice from the US. Liberty Link rice varieties were engineered by Bayer Crop Science to be 
tolerant to Liberty Link herbicides and were not approved by the US at the time of the AP event. 
Even though LL601 was under development between 1997 and 2001, it was not approved for 
deregulation
7 (safe for commercial use) by the USDA (Blue, 2007) until November, 2006.
8 The 
EC adopted Decision 2006/578/EC, which established the conditions under which the imports of 
long grain rice from the US c ould continue. Each consignment of long grain rice from the US 
must be accompanied by a report   demonstrating the absence of unauthorized GM material, 
secondly, the MS had to take necessary control measures for products already in the EU market 
and, thirdly,  the EFSA was requested to provide scientific support on this issue. The EFSA 
concluded in September of 2006 that there was insufficient available information to complete a 
comprehensive risk assessment, and based on the available information, it  was likely that the 
consumption of long grain rice contaminated with LL601 d id not pose any imminent s afety 
concern to humans or animals (EC, 2006). 
 
The LL601 event resulted in a reduction of US total acres planted to rice (mostly long 
grain rice) by 3.37 percent in 2007 due to the lack of GM-free seed. The economic losses due to 
export impacts were estimated to be US$254 million for the 2006/2007 crop year, while future 
export losses were estimated to be between US$89 and $445 million, dependent upon how long 
the two largest export markets, the EU and the Philippines, r emain closed (Blue, 2007). The 
same report estimates the direct and indirect losses experienced by rice producers due to a price 
reduction, increased storage time, reduced seed stocks, increased testing requirements, clean up 
of the  supply chain  and lost revenue to be approximately US$200 mi llion. Rice processors 
incurred costs of approximately US$90 million to ensure a GM -free system, while BASF, the 
developer of the Clearfield 131 seed line, a non -GM rice line which was contaminated with 
LL62 and LL604, lost between US$1 and $15 million. Th e worldwide estimated losses due to 
the LL601 contamination range from US$741 to US $1,285 million, including worldwide food 
                                                            
7 The regulation of GM products in the US is provided by three governmental agencies: USDA‟s Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Health and 
Human Services‟ Food and Drug Administration (FDA). All three regulatory agencies have the responsibility of 
ensuring that GM crops allowed for release will not have negative impacts on human health or the environment. A 
GM  crop  is  deregulated  when  the  regulatory  agencies  have  determined,  based  on  full  human  health  and 
environmental assessments, that the crop does not pose any risk to human health or environment. Once deregulated, 
the GM crop does not require the review of regulatory agencies for movement or release in the US (USDA, 2010). 
8 In November 2006, the US regulatory agencies concluded that LibertyLink rice does not pose any risk to human 
health, food safety and the environment and, thus, APHIS extended deregulation for LLRICE601 (USDA, 2007). 11 
 
recalls and the export shipping losses. The costs of the contamination event are even larger if the 
punitive damages against Bayer Crop Science LLP are taken into account
9. The ban of US rice 
cost between 3.5 and 7.5 million Euros per rice importer (Gruere, 2009).  
 
  3.3.3  CDC Triffid  
 
Canada is the world largest producer and exporter of flax, with an average of 746,000 
metric tonnes production per year between 2000 and 2007, accounting for 40 percent of global 
production. The other three large producers of flax, China, the US and India, collectively account 
for 40  percent of world production. The largest market for Canadian flax is the  EU, which 
normally takes over 70 percent of Canadian flax exports. Other important export markets are the 
US,  China,  Japan,  Australia,  Mexico  and  Brazil  (SaskFlax,  n.d.).  Domestic  flax  production 
occurs mostly in the Canadian prairie provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, with 
Saskatchewan being the largest producer (Figure 2). Most of the flaxseed produced in Western 
Canada is destined for export markets.  
 
 
Source: Flax Council of Canada (n.d.) 
Triffid flax, or FP967, is a GM-flax developed by CDC prior to GMOs becoming a major 
political issue in the EU. However, given the emergence of GMOs as a major issue, the risks 
posed by the EU market‟s reaction to GM products by 2001 a prudent decision was made to 
deregister Triffid and it was never released for commercial distribution. In less than a year, 5,000 
MT of seed were destroyed at a cost of C$3.2 million and the CDC stock was incinerated. Thus, 
                                                            
9 In October 2010, Bayer agreed, out of court, to pay damages in the amount of US$290,000 to eight Texas-based 
plaintiffs  who  are  rice  growers  from  three  farming  operations.  Bayer  still  faces  thousands  of  claims  and  is 
participating in mediation discussions with plaintiffs in ongoing litigation (Western Producer, 2010). As of April 15, 
2010, Bayer had already lost at least four other cases against it, whose judgements were valued at nearly US$52 

















Triffid is a unique case; though, originally approved for food and feed use by Canada and the 
US, contamination took place 8 years after being deregistered. In the cases of Liberty Link rice 
or Starlink corn, the contamination happened before the two GM crops received final approval, 
as cases of AP.  
 
Beginning in July 2009, more than 100 reports of the presence of Triffid in different 
bakery,  cereal  and  other  products  in  a  number  of  EU  member  states  were  received  (See 
Appendix A, Table A.1). In November 2009, trace amounts of Triffid were found in Japan and 
Brazil; Brazil‟s government announced the mandatory testing of all flax shipments from Canada, 
while in January 2010, New Zealand started to develop new import protocols for Canadian flax 
(Smyth  and  Ryan,  2010).  Some  of  Triffid‟s  wide  distribution  was  explained  by  the 
contamination of the breeder seed of two other GM CDC varieties: CDC Normandy and CDC 
Mons. According to the CDC
10, CDC Normandy and CDC Mons  are scheduled to be removed 
from the market, tested and, eventually, de-registered. Overall, 3.5 percent of farm and elevator 
flax samples, 10 to 15 percent of the rail shipments and 7 percent of vessel holds tested positive 
for CDC Triffid (Dawson, 2010). This resul ted in the closure of the EU market to Canadian 
flaxseed.  
 
Brazil also has a zero tolerance policy in place. In November 2009, after detecting traces 
of  FP967  in  Canadian  shipments  of  flaxseed,  the  Brazilian  government  established  the 
mandatory  sampling  of  all  flaxseed  from  Canada,  with  the  rejection  or  destruction  of  lots  
contaminated with traces of FP967. The Canadian and Brazilian governments have negotiated a 
Protocol  including  the  necessary  measures  for  sampling  and  testing  of  Canadian  flaxseed 
destined for Brazil to ensure a zero presence of GM traces (CGC, 2011a). 
 
Due to traces of GMOs found in Canadian flaxseed shipments to Japan, Japan‟s Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries requested that Canada take preventative measures to avoid 
future  contamination  of  flaxseed  exports  to  Japan.  The  Canadian  government  developed  a 
Protocol outlining the sampling, testing and detection measures to avoid the presence of GM 
traces greater than the allowable tolerance level of one percent. The Protocol covers the bulk 
shipments of flaxseed for industrial and feed use. If, after a certain period of time determined by 
Japan‟s  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fisheries,  compliance  with  the  protocol  is 
demonstrated and negative certificates are provided and validated by the Canadian government, 
the Japanese authorities will not conduct monitoring (CGC, 2011b). 
 
The  Protocols  for  Canadian  flaxseed  shipments,  including  for  Brazil  and  Japan,  are 
generally  based  on  similar  principles,  procedures  and  structures,  with  some  country-specific 
tailoring (CGC, 2011d). For example, the Protocol with Japan has a five rail-car limit for testing 
sample size not included in the Brazil Protocol. Similar to the EU Protocol, Brazil requires that 
the testing laboratory be ISO17025-accredited while Japan does not. The Protocols also differ in 
terms of information sharing and review requirements (CGC, 2011a; 2011b).  
 
 
                                                            
10 As stated by Dorothy Murell, Managing Director of CDC, cited in Dawson (2010). 
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a.  Sampling and Testing Protocol for Canadian Flaxseed Exported to the European Union 
 
Prior to the RASFF notification, in August 2009, German authorities transmitted to the 
EU CRL, a construct-specific method for detecting CDC Triffid Flax using Real-time PCR. The 
detection method was developed by Genetic ID NA, Inc., of Augsburg (Germany). The method 
was specific to the Triffid genetic modification as it targeted a construction found only in Triffid 
flax. The original method was replaced in October 2009 with a newer version developed by the 
same company. 
 
Canada responded quickly to the closure of the EU flaxseed market by developing a 
Sample and Testing Protocol. The main goal of the Protocol is to meet the EU‟s strict import 
requirements of zero tolerance for unauthorized GMO traces and to assure a secure flaxseed 
supply. Thus, the Protocol establishes the sampling, testing and documentation measures that 
must be followed along the entire supply chain of Canadian flaxseed destined for the EU (CGC, 
2010b).  
 
Even though the original protocol was accepted by the EU Member States in October 
2009, it imposed a large level of risk for both Canadian exporters and EU officials and importers, 
as the final test results were made available only after transport vessels departed from Canada. 
This lag time resulted in the quarantining of some flaxseed shipments in the port of Ghent, 
Belgium after samples tested positive for FP967 – a very costly point in the supply chain for 
refusals to take place. In response, the protocol was revised in March 2010, and a pre-load test at 
the port of export (“in-store samples”) was added, allowing for the final results to be known 
before  transport  vessels  were  loaded  (Hall,  2011).  Although  there  could  be,  there  is  not 
necessarily any further testing once ships have arrived in EU ports
11.  
 
In terms of sampling, the protocol specifies that three samples of flaxseeds must be 
collected at different levels of the supply chain: by the grain handling company from each 
producer delivery (sample retained for at least six months from the delivery date); before loading 
the railcar, with each railcar being sampled and the composition of samples comprised of not 




If the composite sample tests positive for the presence of FP967 at the grain handling 
level, all railcars that tested positive are removed from the aggregate flaxseed shipment destined 
for export to the EU and the list of railcars that tested negative is transmitted to CGC. The CGC 
samples all railcars carrying flax destined for the EU, monitors the unloading of each railcar in a 
designated silo, then seals and records the silo and seal number. A  2.5 kg composite sample is 
prepared from each si lo and sent  to an ISO 17025 accredited laboratory  for testing. The 
laboratory must be from the list of  laboratories approved for testing flaxseed shipments to the 
European Union
13. These approved laboratories use a construct-specific method verified by the 
                                                            
 
12 The CGC has published a guide on sampling methods: “Sampling systems handbook and approval guide” (CGC, 
2010b). 
13 The CGC confirms the proficiency of laboratories to test flaxseed samples using the qualitative PCR assay as per 
the construct-specific method approved within the Protocol for the EU .  CGC  maintains two separate lists of 14 
 
European  CRL  and  operate  in  accordance  with  the  ISO  17025  standard  on  “General 
requirements for competence and testing and calibration laboratories” (CGC, 2010a). Any silo in 
a grain handling or storage facility that tested positive will be diverted from the EU flaxseed 
supply. The CGC also monitors the loading of negative silos onto transport vessels to ensure they 
are not destined for the EU and prepares an official Letter of Analysis which is presented to the 
Canadian flaxseed exporter, who, in turn, provides it to the appropriate EU authorities.  
 
b.  Economic Impact of Triffid Contamination 
 
The  most  immediate  impact  of  the  Triffid  contamination  case  was  upon  Canadian 
flaxseed exports. From a high of 321,400 tonnes of total flaxseed exports for the crop year 2008-
09, the level of exports dropped by 124,800 tonnes to 196,600 tonnes for the crop year 2009-10. 
Exports to the EU decreased from 86,100 tonnes in December of  2008 to 54,300 tonnes in 
December, 2009 (CGC, 2011c). Exports of flaxseed to the EU continued to drop until May 2010 
when they reversed to an increasing trend. One other interesting consequence of the Triffid case 
is the large increase of flaxseed exports to China. As can be seen in Figure 3, from being a 
negligible import market during 2008, China imported a high of 55, 200 tonnes of flaxseed in 




Source: Authors‟ calculations based on CGC (2011c). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
laboratories, one of labs that have met the CGC‟s proficiency requirements to test samples, including producer 
samples, for the presence of FP967 (Laboratories proficient in testing flaxseed samples for the presence of FP967). 
These labs may not qualify to test bulk shipments of Canadian flaxseed ultimately destined for the EU. The second 
list is of laboratories (Laboratories approved for testing flaxseed shipments to the European Union) that are ISO 

















































































































































Among the three largest producers of flaxseed in Canada, Alberta (the smallest among 
the three) typically presents the lowest farm price level for flax. Figure 4 shows the average 
flaxseed farm price for the three flaxseed producing provinces as they reflect the same declining 
trend.  The  average  farm  price  dropped  from  C$490.80/tonne  in  December,  2008  to 
C$357.40/tonne in December, 2009 and the decline continued to May, 2010. In May of 2011, the 
average  farm  price  for  flaxseed  reached  the  highest  level  since  2008  at  C$566.38/tonne 
(Statistics Canada, 2011). However, the decline in flaxseed price cannot be attributed solely to 
the  Triffid  event  as  all  crop  prices  suffered  a  severe  price  decline  starting  mid-2008.  As 
European and Chinese prices for flaxseed are not available, the exact effect of the Triffid event 
on price cannot be isolated and measured. However, as can be observed in Figure 4, the flaxseed 
average price declined to a greater degree after September 2009 than the average prices of wheat 
and canola during the same period. Thus, both general market conditions and the Triffid event, 




Source: Authors‟ calculations based on Statistics Canada data (2011). 
The  gradual  increase  in  Canadian  exports  to  the  EU,  combined  with  the  increasing 
average farm price for flaxseed which began in May 2010, subsequent to the adoption of the 
revised Protocol, shows that general market conditions have improved, but also that Canada‟s 
efforts in preserving the flax industry are producing beneficial results, given that the increase in 
average price for flaxseed is larger than for the other two crops chosen for comparison. 
 
These efforts are not without costs however. The overall value of Canadian flax exports 
has still not recovered and the Canadian flaxseed industry must absorb substantial storing, testing 










Figure 4: Average farm price (AB, SK, MB) (dollars per tonne) 
Wheat (not including payments)  Canola  Flaxseed 16 
 
Testing  is  performed  at  each  level  of  the  supply  chain.  Initially,  each  producer  was 
required to submit to an approved laboratory, a 1 kg sample for every 75 to 125 tonnes (3,000 to 
5,000 bushels) of his crop. Prior to September 1, 2010, the cost of each producer test was C$105.  
After September 1, 2010, the cost of testing increased to C$240 for four subsamples from an 
initial 2 kg sample (SaskFlax, 2010). According to the Flax Council of Canada (2011), each 2 kg 
sample represents a lot size not exceeding 5,000 bushels, if the same seed source was used for 
the entire crop and the field‟s cropping history has not changed. In January 2011, the Canadian 
Federal  Government  announced  a  new  funding  initiative  under  the  Canadian  Agricultural 
Adaptation Program (CAAP) which provided C$1.5 million to partially cover the testing costs 
incurred by Western Canadian flax producers. The first stage of the program concentrates on 
testing flax seeds for planting, both pedigreed and farm-saved, for the crop year 2011-12. As of 
January 1 2011, producers receive a 50 percent discount from the regular cost of testing up to a 
maximum of C$100 per sample from the approved laboratories. Starting in August 2011, the 
program will be extended to the testing of all flax production (Flax Council of Canada, 2010). 
Thus, the costs of testing the purity of flax have partially been transferred from the industry to 
Canadian taxpayers.  
 
In addition to the negative international trade impacts, co-mingling of non-GM by GM 
products imposes large economic losses for the EU. These include additional costs for the EU 
food industry, reduced profitability, disruption of processing activities, increased risk of doing 
business in the food sector, possible reduction of the variety of consumer products and potential 
for higher domestic prices (Brookes, 2008). According to the International Food and Agricultural 
Trade  Policy  Council  (IPC)  (2005),  the  global  costs  of  segregation  in  European  and  other 
markets have been considerably increased given the number of samples, the type of assessment, 
the  number  of  events  that  have  to  be  tested  and  the  number  of  crops  to  be  evaluated.  The 
estimates  reported  below  were  prepared  for  the  international  negotiations  for  the  Cartagena 
Protocol on Biodiversity and provides costs based on two commodities from two large exporters, 
the US and Argentina: 
 
If all 3,575 export cargoes of maize from the United States and Argentina were 
sampled  and  tested  only  once  at  loading,  the  total  cost  to  indicate  a  cargo  “may 
contain” LMOs
14 would be $1 million dollars. If, on the other hand, exporters are 
required to identify and quantify individual varieties, as some countries have proposed, 
the labelling and testing costs for maize alone, from only these two countries of origin, 
could  quadruple  to  $4.4  million  annually.  If  more  extensive  sampling  is  required, 
annual testing costs for maize alone could balloon to $18 to $87 million. 
If laboratory tests at the export origin must be confirmed at the import destination, 
testing costs alone could double. There would be additional costs to cover delays. 
Laboratory tests for LMOs generally require a five to seven day turnaround. Each day 
a ship waits to unload in port costs approximately $30,000. Delays would be shorter in 
developed countries, with nearby laboratories that can expedite test results. But, these 
delays would be longer for developing countries, which do not have laboratories able 
to perform these tests and would need to send samples overseas for testing. These 
delays would add millions of dollars in demurrage costs paid by developing countries. 
                                                            
14 Living Modified Organism 17 
 
At  present,  the  additional  annual  cost  to  consumers  in  Japan  and  Europe  of 
acquiring non-LMO soybeans and maize approaches $100 million (IPC, 2005, pp. 2). 
 
The  European  Commission  Directorate  General  for  Agriculture  studied  the  economic 
impacts  of  the  presence  of  unauthorized  GMOs  on  feed  and  livestock  markets  in  the  EU. 
Whereas an interruption of maize imports was unlikely to have strong economic impacts on feed 
imports and livestock production at the EU level, a two year import interruption of soybean 
imports from the US, Argentina and Brazil was found to increase feeding expenditures by 23 to 
600 percent with disastrous effects on the livestock and meat sector (EC, 2008b).  
 
Regarding the additional costs that the Triffid event has imposed on the EU, they are 
represented,  firstly,  by  the  in-port  quarantine  costs  incurred  by  EU  importers,  traders  and 
processors when a shipment is found to be contaminated by GM products as shipments become 
the responsibility of the EU purchaser once they leave Canadian jurisdiction. Secondly, the EU 
can incur its own testing costs as testing can be conducted at each level of the supply chain. 
Thirdly,  the  EU  livestock  industry  has  suffered  major  shortages  in  the  feed  supply  chain.  
Finally, by far the largest users of imported flaxseed, EU industrial firms that use linseed oil as a 
major input to linoleum and paint have suffered from disruptions in input supplies as, at least in 
the short-run, alternative sources of supply have simply not been available. 
 
According to a study conducted by COCERAL
15 and FEDIOL
16, the total additional costs 
incurred by the EU flaxseed industry due to the Triffid event amount to € 23,530,000 (Table 2) 
(Dayananda, 2011). 
 
Table 2: Total Additional Cost for EU Flaxseed Industry 
due to Triffid Event 
Cost Category  Cost € 
Decrease in profit  1,700,000 
Recalled products  2,100,000 
Destroyed products  1,300,000 
Storage cost (blocked products)  130,000 
Customers‟ claims
17  18,000,000 
Shutting down operations  300,000 
Total Additional Cost  23,530,000 
Source: Dayananda, 2011. 
 
According to the same study, imports of flaxseed from countries other than Canada could 
not replace the imports sourced from Canada and, thus, low supply together with additional 
management costs have resulted in a sharp increase of flaxseed price in the EU. As a large 
number  of  products  have  been  recalled,  extra  costs  were  incurred  by  traders  due  to  freight, 
storage, sampling, monitoring or even the destruction of some products. 
                                                            
15 The Committee of cereals, oilseeds, animal feed, oils and fats, olive oil and agrosupply trade of the EU. 
16 The European oil and protein-meal industry federation. 
17 Refunds for food delivered to customers containing flaxseed. 18 
 
Thus, a zero tolerance policy creates an uncertain environment which imposes major 
risks for businesses involved in trading activities and large economic losses to both EU importers 
and their foreign suppliers.   
 
4.0  Conclusions 
 
In 2006, a WTO Panel found that the EU‟s moratorium on the import of products derived 
from the use of modern biotechnology contravened the EU‟s SPS obligations. The EU said it 
would  comply  with  the  Panel‟s  ruling,  but  that  it  would  take  time.  Although  the  EU  had 
established the new regime to govern domestic management and imports of GM-products by 
2003,  an  assessment  of  its  full  implications  had  to  wait  until  the  system  could  be  seen  in 
operation. Further, the EU regulatory regime for GM-products is very much a work in progress. 
In particular, as the Member States of the EU learn how the system operates, some Members 
have taken actions to prevent outcomes they don‟t like. The European Commission has had to 
acquiesce to considerable autonomy in Member State‟s regulatory regimes for GM-products. 
This latter phase of devolution of GM-policy to Member States is new and untested, meaning 
that the EU regulatory regime for GM-products is not transparent.  There are two major areas of 
the EU regulatory regime for GM-products where there is a need for clarification. The first is the 
approval process for new GM-products in the EU and is discussed in detail in the companion 
paper by Viju et al., (2011). The second is how imports contaminated with GM-products are 
dealt with in the regulatory regime. 
 
Recently, a new GM-product has finally worked its way through the new EU approval 
process meaning that the regulatory regime for new products can be evaluated. Further, the case 
of Canadian flax exports contaminated by GM-flax has recently arisen and a new import regime 
put in place. Hence, its working can also be evaluated. 
 
Does the new EU regulatory regime conform to its WTO obligations? Under the WTO, 
the process used to put trade barriers in place justified on sanitary and phytosanitary grounds are 
supposed to be science-based. In the EU, neither the regulatory regime for approval of new 
products, nor the mechanisms for dealing with contaminations are science-based.  
 
The  regulatory  regime  for  contamination  permits  the  imposition  of  import  bans  with 
neither a scientific justification nor a risk assessment. No scientific assessment of Triffid flax 
was done prior to the import ban. The import regime put in place to deal with the contamination 
of  flax  with  the  GM-flax  CDC  Triffid  provides  no  rationale  for  the  thresholds  of  safety 
established for the testing regime. The EU is consistently pushing for commercial, economic and 
social considerations to be included, along with science, in decision-making. Such considerations 
are often perceived as avenues for economic protection to creep into EU decision-making. Such 
considerations can, however, cut both ways. The Canada-EU testing regime for Triffid makes 
provision for, but does not necessarily require, the testing of cargoes when they reach European 
ports (Western Producer, 2010). The risks associated with inspection upon arrival made exports 
to Europe too risky. By only requiring the passing of the tests prior to product leaving Canada, 
flexibility to find alternative markets for contaminated cargoes has been gained. Thus, while 
costly, the testing regime for flax exports to the EU has allowed for the resumption of Canadian 
flax exports to the EU. Of course, the import Protocol negotiated between the EU and Canada for 19 
 
flax was a one off. In a future case, economic and commercial considerations could be used to 
bolster economic protection. This is why science was agreed upon as the arbitrator of SPS-based 
trade barriers by the Member States of the WTO, including the EU. Thus, the EU regulatory 
regime  for  GM-products  would  seem  open  to  a  new  challenge  at  the  WTO.  Of  course,  the 
political consequences of such a challenge would have to be carefully weighed.   
   20 
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Appendix A 
Table A.1: Contamination incidents involving Triffid FP967 
Date 
(2009) 
Country   Distributed to   Product   RASFF* 
number 
8-Sep  Germany   Switzerland and Poland   Cereals/bakery 
products  
2009.1171 
11-Sep  Germany   Austria and Mauritius   nuts, nut products 
and cereals  
2009.1198 
15-Sep  Germany   Netherlands, Luxembourg, 




18-Sep  Germany   Austria   Cereals/bakery 
products  
2009.1228 
21-Sep  Germany   Luxembourg   Cereals/bakery 
products  
2009.1232 
24-Sep  Germany   Austria and Mauritius   Cereals/bakery 
products  
2009.1247 
1-Oct  Germany   Belgium, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Republic of Korea, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Singapore, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, 











5-Oct  Germany   None   Animal Feed   2009.1279 
5-Oct  Germany   None   Animal Feed   2009.1281 
5-Oct  Germany   None   Animal Feed   2009.1286 
5-Oct  Austria   Austria, Croatia, France, 
Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Switzerland  
Cereal and Bakery 
Products  
2009.1287 
6-Oct  Austria   None   Cereal and Bakery 
Products  
2009.1295 
6-Oct  Austria   None   nuts, nut products 
and seeds  
2009.1294 
6-Oct  Germany   Egypt, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Spain  
cereals and bakery 
products  
2009.1289 




6-Oct  Austria   Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Romania, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia  
linseed whole grain   2009.1296 
6-Oct  Germany   France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Switzerland  
brown linseed   2009.129 
7-Oct  Germany   None   cereals and bakery 
products  
2009.1297 
7-Oct  Germany   Mauritius   cereals and bakery 
products  
2009.1298 
7-Oct  Romania   Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Germany, Italy, Poland, 
Romania, Switzerland  
linseed in frozen 
bakery products  
2009.1299 
8-Oct  Germany   None   linseed in baking 
mixture  
2009.1311 
8-Oct  Germany   Austria   linseed in baking 
mixture  
2009.1313 
8-Oct  Germany   Netherlands   linseed   2009.1316 
8-Oct  Sweden   Italy   linseed   2009.1307 
8-Oct  Germany   Macedonia, The Former 
Republic Of Yugoslav, 
Greece,  
brown linseed   2009.1308 
8-Oct  Germany   Poland, Luxembourg, 
Austria, Czech Republic, 
Spain and Hong Kong,  
brown linseed   2009.1309 
8-Oct  Germany   None   linseed   2009.1314 
9-Oct  Germany   None   linseed   2009.1318 
9-Oct  Austria   Poland   linseed   2009.1322 
9-Oct  Austria    None  linseed   2009.1323 
12-Oct  Cyprus   Switzerland, Belgium, 
Romania, Poland, Italy, 
Denmark, Czech Republic, 
Austria  
linseed in frozen 
bakery products  
2009.1331 
12-Oct  Finland   Latvia, Estonia   linseed in frozen 
bakery products  
2009.1335 
13-Oct  Germany   import via Poland   linseed   2009.1339 
13-Oct  Germany   None   brown linseed   2009.134 
13-Oct  Germany   Bulgaria, Austria, Czech 
Republic, Germany, 
Croatia, Romania, Serbia, 
Slovenia, Slovakia  
linseed   2009.1341 
13-Oct  Germany   Slovakia, Slovenia, Serbia, 
Romania, Croatia, 
Germany, Czech Republic, 
Bulgaria, Austria  
linseed   2009.1342 27 
 
14-Oct  Germany   Austria   linseed   2009.1349 
14-Oct  Germany   Austria   linseed   2009.1351 
15-Oct  Germany   Italy, Ireland, Hungary, 
Croatia, Greece, United 
Kingdom, France, Spain, 
Germany, Czech Republic, 
Switzerland, Belgium, 
Austria, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Portugal, Poland, 
Netherlands  
linseed in bakery 
mixture  
2009.1363 
15-Oct  Germany   None   linseed meal (animal 
feed)  
2009.1365 
20-Oct  Greece   None   brown linseed   2009.1388 
21-Oct  Germany   None  linseed in bakery 
mixtures  
2009.1397 
21-Oct  Germany   Slovenia, Hungary, 
Germany, Greece, Austria  
brown linseed   2009.14 
22-Oct  Italy   Slovenia   linseed   2009.1413 
22-Oct  Germany   Italy, Portugal, Malta   brown linseed   2009.1414 
26-Oct  Cyprus   None   linseed in bakery 
mix from Germany  
2009.1444 
27-Oct  Cyprus   None   brown linseed   2009.1453 
28-Oct  Germany   Sweden, Poland, 
Netherlands, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Lithuania, 
Italy, United Kingdom, 




linseed in bakery 
products  
2009.1462 
29-Oct  Germany   Austria   linseed   2009.1472 
30-Oct  Germany   Austria   linseed   2009.1474 
30-Oct  Luxembourg   None   brown linseed   2009.1476 
30-Oct  Luxembourg   None   linseed   2009.1477 
30-Oct  Luxembourg   None   linseed   2009.1485 
3-Nov  Germany   None   brown linseed   2009.1489 
4-Nov  Slovenia   None   brown linseed   2009.1497 




4-Nov  Germany   None   linseed in bakery 
mixture  
2009.1501 
3-Nov  Germany   None   brown linseed   2009.1506 
4-Nov  Finland   imported via Israel   linseed in food  2009.BXE 28 
 
supplement  
5-Nov  Greece   None   organic brown 
linseed  
2009.1515 
6-Nov  Switzerland 
(via EU 
Commission)  
None   linseed in muesli   2009.1523 
6-Nov  Switzerland 
(via EU 
Commission)  
United Kingdom   brown linseed   2009.1524 
6-Nov  Germany   None   brown linseed   2009.1531 
Source: GeneWatch UK and Greenpeace International (2010). 